

IDENTITY, RELIGION, REPRESSION, OR FASHION? THE INDONESIAN JILBAB

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If the meat was covered, the cats wouldn't roam around it. If the meat is inside the fridge, they won't get it.

If the woman is in her boudoir, in her house and if she is wearing the veil and if she shows modesty, disasters don't happen...

Sheik Taj Din al-Hilali, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 October 2006

This statement by Sheik Taj Din al-Hilali, a senior Muslim cleric in Sydney, once again brought into focus conflicting perceptions different cultures have concerning female dress codes, in particular head covering, the hijab, or in Indonesia, the *jilbab*. In a similar fashion a young Indonesian cleric, Jefri al-Buchori, stated during the fasting month of Ramadan in 2006, that Muslim women should wear a *jilbab* to protect their modesty. In a plethora of quasi-religious talk shows this statement was seen as nothing special, yet provocatively, al-Buchori compared covered women with expensive doughnuts packed in plastic-covered boxes and because of their “hygienic and exclusive” status, no one could harm or touch them.¹ This comment on national television did not draw as much controversy as his Australian counterpart; nonetheless in the following weeks it drew contemptuous responses from many Indonesian women. As one observer dryly noted, “even the most expensive doughnuts these days are packed in boxes”² but the cleric’s popularity did not decrease.

As Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world and is Australia’s nearest neighbour, it is important to consider Islam and Islamic signifiers in that society. A woman wearing a headscarf is the most visible symbol of personal dress in Islamic culture and is repeatedly the focus of cultural debate in Western countries.

In the exhibition *Transindonesia* (Govett-Brewster Gallery, New Plymouth, New Zealand, 2004), which scoped culture in contemporary Indonesian art, artist Angki Purbandono exhibited life-sized reproductions of an Islamic woman’s dress with people invited to pose with their own faces inserted in the cut out section of the head. The results were strange and dislocating images of European faces in a headscarf or *jilbab*. The viewer was thus challenged to consider why women wear the *jilbab* and what it might represent.

Interest in this issue was sparked by our research in contemporary Indonesian visual arts, conducted by an Indonesian post-graduate student studying and working in Australia and an Australian PhD. student visiting Indonesia. We could appreciate both the Western resentment at women being required to cover themselves and the Muslim resentment at the superficiality of focusing on dress when discussing Islam. As is quite common when socio-political issues are addressed through art, our research crossed disciplines and we found that the wearing of the *jilbab* expanded swiftly into issues of gender and religion. We noted that religion and gender issues are rarely addressed directly in Indonesian visual arts and we questioned why this should be. There was though much interest and debate concerning gender equality amongst female artists, both post and undergraduate when they were interviewed in Indonesia. Ultimately the issues encompass whole areas of culture impossible to cover in one project, so the *jilbab* became for us a symbol, a focus and an indicator.

The *jilbab* in Indonesia, *tudung* in Malaysia or less-commonly, *hijab* in English-speaking countries, are all terms for the head cover worn by Muslim women (*Muslimah*). It is required to cover body parts considered the *aurat*, or those parts of women’s body only to be seen by family members. For some this is only covering the hair and for others the full head to toe cover with a face screen, known as the *burqa*. The wearing of a *jilbab* in Indonesian society has not been a problem before, rather it was one of the things that one does as a *Muslimah*, attending sermons in the mosque, joining Qur’an recitation or personal Qur’an reading groups. It was rarely imposed on individuals or used to reflect a degree of piety; it was simply a tool for an Indonesian woman to express her religious commitment. But is it really that simple?

The wearing of the *jilbab* has noticeably increased in Southeast Asian Muslim societies and in Indonesia:

*Until recent decades the wearing of the headscarf... was not widespread. In Indonesia, the reformist movement promoted the wearing of the jilbab for women in the 1920s and 1930s. However, while it was a clearly recognised symbol of piety, it is only since the 1980s that it has become more accepted and popular there.*³

One Indonesian *Muslimah* who was interviewed for this text reported that she started to wear a *jilbab* when she was in secondary public school or SMA.⁴ She was the first member of her family to do so and said her mother was not allowed to wear the headscarf when she was at school; it was discouraged under the Suharto Regime.⁵ School uniforms vary in Indonesia, some schoolgirls wearing the *jilbab* in combination with a long grey skirt, or just the headscarf. Others can be seen wearing jeans and *jilbabs*, erupting from their educational institutions and slinging a leg over the rear saddle of their boyfriend’s motorbike as they zoom off. Worn this way the *jilbab* combines modernity with an Indonesian Islamic identity, an Indonesian style informed by familiarity with international fashion.

The Islamic Reform movement in the 1920s and 1930s was allied with the nationalist movement for independence from the Dutch colonial regime—therefore the wearing of the *jilbab* can be understood as part of Indonesian Muslim identity. President Suharto, after establishing his New Order Regime or *Orde Baru* after 1965, resisted pressures to make Indonesia a Muslim State and it was not until the “increasing affirmation of Islamic identity and piety across the nation”⁶ being felt by the late 1980s that he modified his position and sought political support from Islamic interests. The regeneration of Islam in Indonesia has not though translated into an Islamic political State although there has been pressure to do so, and most of the Muslim population is leaning towards a cultural rather than a political Islam. As has been pointed out, “no one among the prominent Muslim political leaders even subscribes to the idea or aims to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia at the expense of Pancasila”, the five basic principles of the Republic.⁷

This tendency to favour a cultural rather than a political Islam is overlooked by the Western media in their preoccupation with fundamentalism.

Muslim women in the West are also increasingly wearing the *jilbab*. A young student in France said, “I get strange looks when I wear my headscarf around town. Some have a look of pity, that says ‘poor girl, she is oppressed’”,⁸ and the editor of a leading Muslim magazine said, “Modesty is only one of many reasons why a woman wears a scarf. It can be a very political choice too.”⁹ Even the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair has entered the discussion of the meaning attached to wearing a veil or headscarf,¹⁰ and the Chirac Government in France has legislated against the wearing of religious symbols in State schools. The French policy appears to focus on the headscarves of Muslim girls and with them, the ten percent of the French population who identify themselves as Muslim.

Kevin Dunn of Sydney’s University of New South Wales assisted in a survey conducted into public attitudes towards the wearing of the *hijab* in Australia, which concluded eighty-one of those surveyed “were not bothered”. This was distinctly different from a survey in France, which recorded sixty percent. Although Dunn expressed concern about the parameters of his research, he deemed it was valuable as it canvassed assumptions as to why the headscarf was worn, and produced a rare empirical assessment of a topic swamped by anecdote and opinion.¹¹

The strong reactions to the wearing of the headscarf in European countries highlights their prejudice and calls into question the cultural stereotypes and hypocrisies of Western politics and media. The Western fascination with the ‘oriental veil’, well illustrated by the Romantic painters of nineteenth-century Europe, resulted in exoticising and eroticising the image of the non-Western female and ignored the religious and cultural bases of the custom. More recently Western feminist theory assumed that veiling is “proof of the gender oppression of women in Islam” and the conviction “that Islamic society is not as progressive as Western society”.¹² Such terminology reinforces the Islam/West dichotomy, being symptomatic of post 9/11 prejudice in the West and an increased defensiveness in Islamic cultures.

In this post 9/11 environment, Indonesia is now facing challenges from outside as well as internal, namely the rise of Islamic fundamentalist groups. Everything is interconnected, and while some may justify the establishment of Shariah law on the basis of safeguarding public morals and providing protection from sexual harassment, others perceive it as an attempt to gain political power. The priority for Shariah law is the wearing of the headscarf, which has been opposed by many women activists, who argue that the regulation requiring wearing of *jilbab* is in practice discriminatory towards non-Muslims as well as an invasion of a woman’s private life.¹³ (Full body covering is rare and considered extreme in Indonesia, the most common form of the *jilbab* is a headscarf covering the hair but exposing the face, combined with loose body covering.)

In Australia the issue has become sensitive particularly since the Cronulla riots and episodes where scarves have been snatched from the heads of *Muslimah*.¹⁴ A project run by the Auburn Community Centre in Sydney culminated in an exhibition titled, *Inside Out: Muslim Women Exploring Identities and Creative Expressions* in 2006.¹⁵ The *hijab*

was addressed by a number of the artists in their work as indicated by artist’s statements. One wrote, “My work also explores institutional use of the veil as a negative and debasing symbol. I investigate how the fabric around one’s face impinges upon social capital and status as (un)Australian”.¹⁶ Another wrote, “Rigid virginity and chastity laws sit side by side with the overt exploitation of women’s bodies in the Western media. Displayed for all to see but not to be listened to, women’s bodies emerge as trapped recipients for unrelenting dogma or rampant consumerism.”¹⁷ None of the participants in this exhibition was Indonesian, many being from a Lebanese background, expressing post-Cronulla resentment at the way their culture and religion had been depicted. Although they share the wearing of headscarves, generalisations about ‘all Muslims’ serve no purpose, for just as there is not one Christianity, there is not one Islam and Islamic culture in Indonesia not only differs from other forms of Islam but it also differs within Indonesia. Indonesian Islam has been considerably modified by the pre-existing practices of Animism, Buddhism and Hinduism—for example early forms combined with Javanese mysticism—and now there is no clear line between orthodox Islam and heresy in Indonesia.¹⁸

In marriage Javanese practices are combined with Islamic in an Indonesian Muslim ceremony,¹⁹ one commentator describing a bride from Central Java being dressed like a Hindu princess although married according to Muslim custom.²⁰ Some modernist Islamic organisations have sought to Islamicise such customs while others have been more lenient, as indicated by the policies of Nahdlatul Ulama or NU, the Muslim organisation of which Abdurrahman Wahid, recent past President of the Republic, was the leader.²¹ Foremost amongst the reasons given for wearing the *jilbab* is piety, it “signifies obedience to God”²² and that it is a sign of commitment to the Islamic religion or “trying to be a good Muslim woman”.²³ This requirement is found in the Qur’an, but as with the Christian Bible, the Qur’an is subject to interpretation which has been heavily biased against women. In Indonesia the *kyai*, or Islamic religious leaders, and the *ulama* or scholars interpret the Qur’an and promulgate their decisions by *fatwa*, or announcements of Islamic law. Fatayat, the women’s organisation of the NU, among other Islamic organisations, have urged the *kyais* to reinterpret the *Qur’an* in favour of women’s equality with men in order to improve conditions for women.²⁴ In Arabia in the pre-Islamic period, women lived in harsh and extreme conditions in a strong tribal and patriarchal culture. Islam sought to lift the status of women from that of mere property and a sexual object to equality with men. The requirements for certain norms of behaviour and style of dressing, such as covering the upper body were not strictly limited to women but also applied to men; both men and women being required to lower their gaze and to cover their *aurat*. The oft-quoted verses pertaining to the wearing by women of the *jilbab* is *al-Ahzab* (33:59) and *al-Nur* (24:31), yet the verse that asks men to restrain their sexual impulses, as in *al-Nur* (24:30) preceding the verse on *jilbab*, (hence emphasising its level of importance in the discourse) is rarely quoted in various publications on these issues.²⁵

There is debate as to whether a pious woman can choose or is obliged to wear a *jilbab*. Modern urban women often say they choose to wear the *jilbab* but not necessarily all the time. Some only wear it for religious events while others feel they could not separate their daily life from their religious life and only remove the *jilbab* for comfort, for example when swimming or in the gym.²⁶ Julia Suryakusuma writing in the *Jakarta Post*

has argued against enforced wearing of the *jilbab* saying, “So-called ‘Muslim fashion’ has become a new ‘uniform’ imposed by a new bunch of authoritarians”. She argued that her “make-up and jewellery” and “figure-hugging clothes” are just as “West Javanese Muslim” as her friend Neng, who wears the *jilbab* to make her “easily accepted in Muslim communities when she does grass-roots gender training, gives seminars or attends Koranic recitals and other religious meetings”.²⁷

The institutionalisation of the *jilbab* has created a sense of anguish and confusion among Indonesian women. On the one hand many agree that in the post-Suharto years the new-found freedom had undesirable side-effects, such as the exploitation of women in the popular media and the rise of sexual freedom amongst teenagers. Therefore some system for the protection of women and children is necessary. The view that every Muslim woman should be covered for their protection is though, not popular. The issue is most acute during the holy month of Ramadan when both piously covered male and female media celebrities host quasi-religious talk shows on television. This promotes the religious atmosphere of Ramadan, yet everyone knows that afterwards they return to their normal style of clothing.

Numerous fashion magazines present possibilities of being attractive and wearing makeup while fully covered, as if having a bet each way by being simultaneously trendy and pious. The well-known Inneke Koesherawati used to be an actress/model starring in B-grade movies and posing scantily clad in men’s magazines. After undertaking the Hajj in 2001 she started to wear the *jilbab*. This appeared to start a trend and was greeted cynically by the general public. Koesherawati is now a successful TV presenter and stars in soap operas with Islamic themes, championing the combination of *jilbab*-wearing with glamour and success. Is there a contradiction in terms here when the wearing of the *jilbab* signifies modesty, “curbing of sexual desires and exhibiting oneself”?²⁸ Some Muslim women have said they feel safe and protected wearing the *jilbab* and they can then be appreciated for qualities other than sexuality, yet it does not follow that a woman without a *jilbab* is a bad woman and sexually available. Clearly this is contested ground and power and sexuality are problematic within the *jilbab* debate.

Indonesian women reject the Western feminist argument that the *jilbab* symbolises their oppression, yet Indonesia remains a patriarchal society prioritising male interests in government, law and the economy. Men are identified as the head of their households. They are viewed and presented as the breadwinners of the family. In contrast, women are identified and presented as nurturers. They bear children, raise families, and operate predominantly within the family sphere. Such clear identification of roles creates the possibility and reality of men acquiring the right or the ability to determine the nature of interaction between members of the family and society at large.²⁹

Feminism claims that the *jilbab* is a symbol of this circumscribed position in society and that the responsibility for public morality is placed primarily on women, making their dress and behaviour the cause of male responses.

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HIPNOTIS, Benarkah Bebas Mistis?





Feminism in Indonesia though, is regarded as a Western concept promoting opposition to men, rather than the empowering of women. Indonesian Muslim feminists however, are slowly making their voices heard on this issue.³⁰ Most of these progressive scholars agree that wearing *jilbab* is an option as opposed to an obligation.³¹ While there is still some way to go for this progressive idea to be accepted by the mainstream Muslim, modern urban women are increasingly independent and well informed and express the belief that they can negotiate a better space for themselves within Islam. Women in public office have sought to negotiate a position for women's interests, although this could not be successfully said of the first female president of the Republic, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Although there is no explicit ruling that prevents women from holding power outside a religious context, her leadership was challenged and she was supplanted by Abdurrahman Wahid.³²

Khofifah Indar Parawansa was one of the new breed of women activists in government and when appointed State Minister for the role of women in Adurrahman Wahid's government, changed the name to the more proactive title—State Ministry for Women's Empowerment. She wrote,

*Religious teachings have strongly influenced society's mindset and the way of life in Indonesia. Unfortunately, many ulama (Muslim religious scholars), preachers and religious leaders do not have enlightened views on gender. Even though the new President of Indonesia is a woman, gender mainstreaming will still be required to effect a change in attitude.*³³

Both in the case of Khofifah and Wan Azizah, wife of Anwar Ibrahim, who was imprisoned by rival Mahathir in Malaysia, the wearing of the *jilbab* could be interpreted as a subtle signal that a traditional Muslim woman can also advocate reform.³⁴

Where the visual arts are concerned there is a striking absence of the wearing of the headscarf by women artists, which may be an indication of their modern, independent and secular attitudes, but it is also striking that although gender issues are very important to them, barely any have used their art to address issues of religion or the position of women. As examples who have—Dolorosa Sinaga uses the female figure in most of her sculptures. She has worked in support of the National Commission on Violence Against Women and was herself Dean of the Faculty of Art and Design for eight years at Institut Kesenian Jakarta or IKJ, the Jakarta art school, making her a rare role model for young women artists. She uses her work as a vehicle for expressing strong sympathy with the problems of women in society, but resists definitions of her work as feminist.³⁵

The artist Titarubi's installation, *Bayang-bayang Maha Kecil (Shadows of the Smallest Kind)* explored her maternal relationship to her children and only indirectly referred to her strict Islamic upbringing. The installation comprised six ceramic busts—of a child modelled from her young daughter—with Arabic texts and illuminated by lighting above. Accompanying each bust was a pair of child's hands turned against the audience and also inscribed in Arabic texts. The gesture of each sculpture belied the calm sense of the installation; it was a gesture of rejection and at the same time of self-protection. The installation had multiple

layers of meaning. It spoke of the concern of the mother, the texts being a mixture of prayers and invocations from the Qur'an and *hadits* to protect the child. Yet the turned hands also expressed resistance to the pressure on children to learn Arabic prayers by heart without understanding the meaning, so the work was also criticising compliance and apathy towards the compulsory teaching in the Indonesian educational system.

Titarubi's installation identified the social construction of religion and indirectly questioned the influence of Arabic culture at the heart of Islamic teaching in Indonesia. Islam in Indonesia always allowed flexibility while retaining the core of Islam's teaching, yet the recent tendency towards a stricter, Saudi-style of Islam is starting to disturb many Indonesian Muslims.

The Dutch-born artist Mella Jaarsma, who has established her artistic career in Indonesia, is one of few who has raised questions in her work about Islamic dress conventions, but only indirectly. Jaarsma has explored the understanding and meaning of a full-length *jilbab* in different cultural contexts beginning with one made out of frog skins exhibited in the touring exhibition *Wearable*, in 1999. When Jaarsma first exhibited the frog skin *jilbab* she watched the reaction of another artist friend, a practising Muslim. He said his first reaction was shock and anger but when he read the artist's statement he said he started to think about the issue she was raising.³⁶

The work was expanded for an installation shown in the *Third Asia-Pacific Triennial* in 1999 in the Queensland Art Gallery and purchased to become a part of its permanent



collection. The installation included three other cloaks, of fish skins, chicken's feet and kangaroo skins (in honour of the country exhibiting the work). Although the cloaks explored many things including food as art, the chicken's feet and frog skins had particular significance as non-*halal*, or unclean food for Muslims. Racial tension between Indonesian ethnic groups had erupted in 1998, focusing particularly on the Chinese community, and Jaarsma's work sought to provoke different cultural perspectives using Muslim clothing constructed from food normally eaten by ethnically Chinese Indonesians.

In one sense Jaarsma's choice of the *jilbab* as a motif for exploring ideas places her as the Western outsider intrigued by the distinctive costume of the oriental world, but in another sense she has played with and developed its symbolism as an Indonesian insider. Her recent works have involved the *jilbab* as tents with the title, *Refugee Only*. Again spectators are invited to imagine themselves the anonymous wearers inside the tent in the ambiguous position that the *jilbab* provides, simultaneously protected and confined.

The wearing of the *jilbab* and its signification is sensitive territory both inside and outside Indonesia and the debate has intensified with the increase of Islamic fundamentalism. Art has been an important medium to question the socio-political structure of the State since before Indonesian independence, but religion and related gender issues seem so sensitive, so essentially a part of the social fabric, that artists have rarely addressed these issues in their work, and then only obliquely.

Opposite: Mella Jaarsma, *Wearable*, 1999
Photo courtesy the artist

Notes

¹ Nong Darol Mahmada, 'Perempuan dan Kue Donat' in <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=1152>

² Mahmada, *ibid*.

³ Sally White, 'Gender and Family', in G. Fealy and V. M. Hooker, *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006: 326

⁴ SMA: Sekolah Menengah Atas, or upper secondary school. Interview, Siti Masyitah Rahma, postgraduate student, University New South Wales, Sydney, 17 January 2007

⁵ Interview Siti Masyitah Rahma

⁶ Merle Calvin Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1200*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001: 379

⁷ *Pancasila*, the five basic principles of the Republic—belief in one God, a just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by representative deliberation and social justice for all. Azyumardi Azra, 'Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia', in V. Hooker and S. Amin eds, *Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004: 143. In 2000 most Muslim organisations, including Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, with a combined following of fifty million, did not approve the resolution in the MPR (the People's Consultative Council) to amend the Constitution's articles on religion; Nur Ahmad Fadhil Lubis, 'Financial Activism among Indonesian Muslims', in Hooker and Amin, *ibid*: 94

⁸ Teycir Ben Nacwer, BBC World News, 1 November 2005; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4376500.stm>

⁹ Fareena Alam, BBC World News, 10 February, 2004; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/europe/3459963.stm>

¹⁰ New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/18/europe/18britain.html>

¹¹ Associate Professor Kevin Dunn, School of Biological, Earth & Environmental Sciences, University of NSW, speaking at the conference, *Not Another Hijab Row, Trans/forming Cultures*, University of Technology, Sydney, 9–10 December, 2006

Above: Titarubi, *Bayang-bayang Maha Kecil (Shadows of the Smallest Kind)* (detail), 2002

¹² Anne Aly, 'The Muted Muslim Woman', abstract of paper given at *Not Another Hijab Row* conference

¹³ For more discussion see Lyn Parker, 'Uniform jilbab', *Inside Indonesia*, July–September 2005: 21–22; 'Sharia inspired by laws the scourge of democracy?', *The Jakarta Post*, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp>; also see Novriantoni, 'Kasus Jilbab Padang dan Fasisme Kaum Moralists', Liberal Islam Network (JIL), <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php>

¹⁴ In December 2005 a series of violent confrontations occurred at Cronulla, a beachside suburb of southern Sydney, between supposed 'beach-goers' and 'invaders from inland suburbs' that was depicted as a clash of Australian and Middle Eastern values; see *Broadsheet* Vol 35 No 3: 158–59

¹⁵ Alissar Chidiac (ed.), 2006, *Inside Out: Muslim Women Exploring Identities And Creative Expressions*, Auburn Community Development Network

¹⁶ Akkawi, *op. cit*: 21

¹⁷ Astore, *op. cit*: 24

¹⁸ Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 56–57

¹⁹ Kathryn Robinson, 'Gender, Islam and culture in Indonesia', in Susan Blackburn (ed.), *Love, Sex and Power Women in Southeast Asia*, Monash Asia Institute, 2001: 20–21

²⁰ Interview, Yogyakarta, 16 July 2001, Anggi Minarni, Director of Karta Pustaka, the Dutch/Indonesian Information Service. Note also <http://www.geocities.com/amemorikaze/wedding3.htm> where a Javanese/Muslim wedding is described with images

²¹ Nur Ahmad Fadhil Lubis, 'Financial Activism among Indonesian Muslims', in Hooker and Amin, *op. cit*: 106

²² Extract from a guide for women in the Islamic College for Women Teachers quoted in Sally White, 'Gender and Family', in Fealy, G. and V. M. Hooker, *Voices Of Islam In Southeast Asia : A Contemporary Sourcebook*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006: 326

²³ *Ibid*: 326

²⁴ Lies Marcoes, 'Women's Grassroots Movements In Indonesia: A Case Study Of The Pkk And Islamic Women's Organisations', in Kathryn Robinson and Sharon Bessell eds, *Women in Indonesia Gender, Equity and Development*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2002: 194. Also Jamhari, Ismatu Ropi (eds), *Citra Perempuan Dalam Islam: Pandangan Ormas Keagamaan*, Gramedia Pustaka Utama Bekerjasama Dengan Ppim-uin Jakarta Dan The Ford Foundation, 2003

²⁵ See Nurjannah Ismail, *Perempuan dalam Pasungan: Bias Laki-laki dalam Penafsiran*, LKIS Yogyakarta, 2003: 58–59 and Amelia Fauzia dan Yuniyanti Chuzaifah, *Apakah Islam Agama untuk Perempuan?*, Centre for Languages and Cultures, Uin Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta Bekerjasama Dengan Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Jakarta, 2003: 11–13

²⁶ Ita, interview, 17 January, 2007

²⁷ Julia Suryakusuma, 'Sexypants and Headscarf: When Minds and Spirits Meet', *Jakarta Post*, 11 October, 2006

²⁸ Q24:31, Haleem, quoted in Fealy and Hooker, *op. cit*: 327

²⁹ Samina Yasmeen, 'Muslim Women and Human Rights in the Middle East and South Asia', in Hooker and Amin, *Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium*: 163–164

³⁰ See Ismail, Yogyakarta, 2003; and Burhanuddin dan Fathurrahman (eds), *Tentang Perempuan Islam: Wacana dan Gerakan*, Gramedia Pustaka Utama Bekerjasama Dengan Ppim-uin Jakarta, 2004; also Ratna Batara Munti dan Hindun Anisah, *Posisi Perempuan dalam Hukum Islam*, LBH APIK, Jakarta 2005

³¹ *Ibid*: 58–59; and interview with Amelia Fauzia, 31 January 2007

³² Rochayah Machali, 'Women and the Concept of Power in Indonesia', in Susan Blackburn (ed.), *ibid*: 8

³³ Khofifah resigned her position when Megawati Sukarnoputri came to power. Khofifah Indar Parawansa, 'Institution Building: An Effort to Improve Indonesian Women's Role and Status', in Kathryn Robinson and Sharon Bessell (eds), *Women in Indonesia Gender, Equity and Development*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2002: 73

³⁴ Louise Edwards and Mina Roces, 'Contesting Gender Narratives, 1970–2000', *Women in Asia*, Allen & Unwin, 2000: 3

³⁵ Interviews Jakarta, 18 May 2002 and 19 April 2005. See also Dolorosa Sinaga, 'Wacana Seni Rupa Perempuan: Antara Konsep dan Konteks', *Aspek-Aspek Seni Visual Indonesia: Politik dan Gender*, Yayasan Seni Cemeti, 2003: 108–125

³⁶ Interview, Mella Jaarsma, 28 June 2000